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It is shown that in Nash bargaining over division of a single good, when agents are allowed to 
distort their van Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions into any (weakly) concave form, 
reporting linear utility functions constitutes a unique dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
1. Introduction 
Nash’s (1950) theory and related theories of bargaining are frequently criticized 
for their lack of empirical content, since their predictions depend on the bargainers’ 
von :Jeumann-Morgenstern utility functions, which are not directly observable. The 
purpose of this letter is to suggest that an approach recently taken by Kurz (1977, 
1978) in a somewhat different context may provide a remedy for this defect. 
Specifically we observe that agents who engage in a Nash bargaining situation may 
desire to misrepresent their utility functions. We can then show that a dominant 
strategy in the preference distortion game is for each agent to report a linear utility 
function. The resulting Nash bargaining solution is therefore equal division, which 
is undoubtedly the most often observed bargaining outcome in experimental bar- 
gaining situations [cf. Nydegger and Owen (1974)]. 
2. The result 
Consider two agents, u and V, with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions 
who are playing divide-the-dollar. We distinguish the agents’ true utility functions 
Us and ut(x) from their reported utility functions u(x) and u(x). The only as 
sumption made concerning the true utility functions is that they are increasing in 
the money pay-off. 
* We are grateful to Mordecai Kurz for helpful discussions. 
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Fig. 1. Nash bargaining solution. 
Whatever bargaining process is used we assume that it satisfies Nash’s (1950) 
axioms and therefore results in an allocation that maximizes the product of the two 
agents’ reported utility gains; i.e., it maximizes (u(x) ~ u(O))(u(l - x) - u(O)). 
Without loss of generality, we will normalize the threat point (u(O), u(O)) to be 
(020). 
Each agent is aware that the outcome of the bargaining game maximizes the 
product of the reported utility functions and therefore each agent considers the 
strategic choice as to which utility function to report. In order for the reported 
utility functions to be credible, we require that they be differentiable, increasing, 
and weakly concave functions, normalized so that u(0) = u(0) = 0. ’ 
Proposition. Reporting u(x) e x is an essentially unique dominant strategy for 
agent u in the distortion game. 
Proof Agent u’s pay-off is the solution to 
max u(x) u( 1 - x), 
O<X$l 
which has first-order condition 
Gx> u(l -x) __=___ 
u’(x) u’(1 -x) . 
Consider fig. 1, where we have graphed the left-hand and right-hand sides of this 
’ Kurz (1977) gives arguments for disallowing risk loving preferences. 
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equation. The line f(x) = u( 1 - x)/u’( 1 - x) is downward sloping since 
f’(x) _ -u’(l -“SW&‘“” -x) < 0 
, 
The line g(x) = u(x)/u’(x) satisfies g(0) = 0 and is upward sloping since 




If agent u reports U(X) =x, g(x) will equal x and the resulting outcome will be 
x*. If agent u reports a utility function with u”(x) < 0 at any point then g’(x) < 1 
at such a point, implying that g(x) will lie above the line g(x) = x. The resulting 
outcome will therefore be strictly less than x* 
Hence it is a dominant strategy for each agent to report u(x) = u(x) =x. The 
resulting Nash bargaining solution is x* = l/2. Q.E.D. 
3. Remarks 
(1) Our result is related to Kurz’s (1977, 1978) observation that a linear utility 
function maximizes each agent’s pay-off in an Auman-Kurz (1977a,b) power and 
taxes game. However, Kurz’s result rests on the particular form of the pay-off func- 
tion in the power and taxes game, which in turn depends crucially on the assump- 
tion of a continuum of agents. 
(2) The proposition could also be proved by appealing to the recent results of 
Kihlstrom, Roth and Schmeidler (1979), who show that a player’s utility at the 
Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution increases as his opponent 
become more risk averse. This result implies that our Proposition is also valid for 
the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. 
(3) Yet another proof of our proposition could be constructed along the lines 
of Kannai’s (1977) observation that among all ordinal representations of an agent’s 
preferences, the ‘least concave’ representation is most advantageous for him to 
report in a Nash bargaining context. 
(4) Sobel(1979) has recently extended our result to the y1 good bargaining prob- 
lem. He shows that any equal income competitive equilibrium for the true utilities 
is a Nash equilibrium outcome for the utility distortion game. 
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